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ABSTRACT 
Although religion has long been a topic closely tied to politics and academic 
scholarship, it was not until the 21st Century that academics seriously turned their 
attention to issues pertaining to the nonbelievers. This inquiry is part of the budding 
scholarship that focuses on the atheists within the United States, and is the first of my 
knowledge to specifically explore the patriotic character of antipathy toward these 
citizens. Patriotic acts, symbolism, and rhetoric are often juxtaposed with references 
to deism, and attacks leveled at atheists frequently employ patriotic references. I 
contend these phenomena are not coincidental. On the contrary, I hypothesize that 
American patriotism propagates dislike for the nonreligious, as deism is so routinely 
drawn upon during patriotic practices, and nonbelievers are a small, largely 
unidentifiable minority. Empirical support for this supposition is provided through 
data from the General Social Survey, yet future research should be aimed at parsing 
out the effect of patriotism on anti-atheist attitudes – potentially in an experimental 
setting. Nonetheless, this analysis provides insight into the origin of negative attitudes 
toward nonreligious Americans, and reveals potential inroads to stifling the most 
socially accepted animosity toward a religious minority in America.
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CHAPTER 1  
ONE NATION UNDER GOD: THE ENTERPRISE 
“…the Constitution promises freedom of religion, not freedom from religion. We are 
after all not just another nation, but ‘one nation under God.’”  
—Sen. Joseph Lieberman, 20001 
 
 Numerous surveys of United States citizens conducted over the second half of 
the 20th century have displayed heightened tolerance toward nearly all groups within 
society. This increased acceptance of minority groups has also been met with 
increased willingness to vote for racial and ethnic minorities, homosexuals, and 
religious minorities. However, atheists remain inordinately repellent to American 
citizens – consistently ranking low in electability and high in enmity compared to 
other minority groups. To be certain, while atheists experience instances of 
discrimination (Cragun, Kosmin, Keysar, Hammer, and Nielsen 2012), comparisons 
to other marginalized groups must be judicious, as atheists are not easily identifiable 
nor have they experienced levels of prejudice faced by other minorities. Nonetheless, 
intolerance, no matter its breadth and depth, influences how politics are conducted. 
And despite lesser willingness to fire teachers, censor texts, or stifle speech (the 
General Social Survey variables on tolerance examined below), it is still socially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 From a speech delivered at Notre Dame University in 2000, while Sen. Lieberman was the 
Democratic Vice Presidential candidate (Lieberman 2000). 
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acceptable to express vitriol toward atheists (e.g., Allen 2009, quotes from political 
leaders throughout).  
Secularization in industrial, further-developed societies is a topic with no 
shortage of commentators, and many in the modern era declared religion to be in its 
terminal stages. But the decline in religiosity throughout portions of the world has 
been met with resurgence in others, and it is now clear that religion is not merely a 
pre-industrial relic2. While topics like secularization in Western Europe, trends in 
religiosity worldwide, and the Christian Right in America have been magnets for 
academic inquiry, scholarship on the nonreligious was sparse until the turn of this 
century. Nevertheless, the last decade has found academics looking at the 
demographics of the nonreligious (Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006, Keysar 2007, 
Sherkat 2008), their prevalence worldwide (Zuckerman 2007), what people think of 
them (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006), the formation of people’s attitudes 
toward them (Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan 2011), as well as other notions 
surrounding nonbelief and the nonreligious. Such inquiry has increased our 
knowledge on the topic significantly, yet there are still many unanswered questions 
regarding nonbelief in the United States. 
One piece of scholarship that garnered significant attention in the press last 
fall was Gervais et al. (2011), which found respondents score atheists and rapists 
equivalently in measures of trust, while Muslims and Christians were viewed as much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Norris and Inglehart (2004) provide a thorough appraisal of thought on the topic, as well as 
empirical investigations of many theories surrounding it.  
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more trustworthy. The article will be examined in closer detail below, but it provides 
a stark contrast to the purported gains made by atheists (e.g., Fischer and Hout 2006) 
in the eye of the public. Gallup polls consistently show the lowest levels of support 
for a generally well-qualified presidential candidate in one’s own party that 
happened to be an atheist – the only group evaluated failing to accrue a majority of 
respondents willing to vote for them – faring worse than homosexuals and other 
marginalized groups (Jones and Saad 2011). Trends in atheist tolerance will be 
compiled below to help illuminate the nature of atheist distaste, followed by an 
investigation into the origin of this negativity – namely its connection to patriotism.  
It might be somewhat surprising that in 2011 a majority of US citizens claim 
they would abstain from voting for an otherwise qualified candidate from their party 
based on the candidate’s religious beliefs, yet this antipathy is not as surprising given 
the pervasiveness of religious symbolism in American patriotic rituals and symbols. 
Look no further than the currency in your wallet, the vast majority of states that 
officially require (35) or encourage (5) the Pledge of Allegiance be recited in public 
schools (Piscatelli 2003), or to the majority of speeches delivered by politicians, and 
you will find references to God, or requests for its favor on the United States. There 
are countless more examples of this juxtaposition of God and country, and the 
culmination of which takes no minor toll on attitudes towards nonbelief.  
In fact, I suggest the attitudes Americans have toward atheists are at least in 
part a product of their attitudes on patriotism. That is, due to the religious tones of 
many patriotic symbols and ceremonies, Americans are imparted with the notion that 
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patriotism is associated with deism, and as such those who are more emphatically 
patriotic are expected to display greater levels of intolerance for atheists. Though I 
find evidence that this relationship exists, recent developments surrounding attitudes 
toward nonbelievers provide inroads for parrying this trend, and the very nature of 
the relationship itself facilitates prescriptions for improving attitudes towards atheists. 
But first, it will be useful to clarify some terminology. 
 
Explicating Terms 
 Each of the variables employed in this inquiry are shrouded with degrees of 
ambiguity. Patriotism is a nebulous concept to rein in, especially when attempting to 
parse it from nationalism. Likewise, the term atheism is often construed many ways 
and has many closely associated designations. Fortunately for this analysis, the 
minutiae of the terms will likely be lost on much of the population, or will at least be 
partially muted by the methodology. However, I would be remiss if I did not clarify 
some definitions at the onset. 
 The term patriotism originates from the Greek patriotes meaning “fellow 
countryman,” referring to one’s origin from their patris, or “fatherland.” Nationalism 
is a more modern term – as the nation-state is a relatively recent development in 
history – and emerged around the turn of the 18th century. Though each can generally 
be thought of as devotion to one’s country, scholarship on the terms has stressed their 
independence (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, Li and Brewer 2004).  
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The notions of patriotism and nationalism share the characteristic of ingroup 
bonding, yet only nationalism also entails belligerence toward the international 
community (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). Further, nationalism is marked by 
antipathy toward internal diversity (Li and Brewer 2004). Li and Brewer (2004) also 
highlight the subtlety of the difference in the notions by providing evidence that 
patriotism still associates with aversion toward minority groups (to a lesser degree 
than nationalism, mind you), but is not strictly incompatible with positive attitudes to 
diversity. For the purposes of this analysis, the distinction between these terms is not 
crucial, as the variable employed was chosen with caution to avoid measuring 
xenophobia rather than ingroup affinity.  
 The term atheism originates from the Greek atheos meaning “without god.” 
However, atheism is also commonly conceived as the assertion that there is no God. 
These are distinct concepts – one being defined negatively, the other positively. 
Atheism also runs very close to the notion of agnosticism, which stems from the 
Greek agnostos meaning “unknown, or unknowable,” and is less an absence of 
theism than recognition of our inability to be certain on such matters. The 
terminology becomes even more arduous when you add the myriad of associated 
groups to the fold, such as: humanists, secularists, secular humanists, naturalists, 
Brights (Dennett 2003), etc.  
 These divisions are tangible yet subtle, and at least one – Brights – has 
emerged as an attempt to create some distance from the word “atheist,” which is 
argued by some (e.g., Dennett 2003, Harris 2007) to be at least partially to blame for 
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negative attitudes directed at nonbelievers. I am sympathetic to such claims, as some 
atheists are just as dogmatic and fervent in their certainty on the supernatural as 
religious zealots. As such, many nonbelievers are reluctant to label themselves as an 
atheist, as evidenced in a Pew Research Center report showing only 24% of 
Americans who do not believe in God refer to themselves by the designation (Pew 
2009). However, Swan and Heesacker (2012) explicitly test whether Americans are 
averse to the label “atheist” specifically, or one “without belief in God” generally. 
They find negative attitudes persist across both formulations of the questioning, and 
do not vary significantly. Furthermore, they found that when asked for an open-ended 
definition of an atheist, 85% of a sample group provided an answer close to 
“someone who does not believe in God.” So it seems the multitude of divisions 
delineating flavors of nonbelief does not alter perceptions in the minds of the public. 
Or, more specifically, there is not a stigma attached to the label “atheist” as much as 
there is sweeping distaste for nonbelievers. This will surely dishearten those that hope 
a new image is all the irreligious need to garner greater acceptance, but it appears the 
animosity runs deeper. That said, for evaluative purposes here, it seems safe to 
assume analysis of attitudes towards atheists will not be sensitive to fluctuations in 
terminology. And atheism will be used interchangeably with nonbelief and irreligion 
throughout.   
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CHAPTER 2  
WITH GOD ON TIM TEBOW’S SIDE: THE GENESIS 
“Before all else, we seek, upon our common labor as a nation, the blessings of 
Almighty God.” 
     —Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 19573 
 
One need not look long to find instances in which citizens of the United States 
convey interesting attitudes on religion4. A most outstanding display of this can be 
seen in a recent poll finding 43% of Americans believe Tim Tebow’s string of come-
from-behind victories in the 2011-12 NFL season was at least partially attributable to 
divine intervention – outnumbering those who replied “no” by one percentage point, 
or about 10 respondents (Jones 2012). Clearly Tim Tebow enamored the United 
States population this year, but how do they feel about atheists? And how do attitudes 
toward the atheists compare to other segments in America? 
Trends on Tolerance 
The General Social Survey (GSS) provides one of the most comprehensive and 
consistent survey data sets on a myriad of social metrics for the United States. One of 
the trends it tracks is tolerance of groups within society. The tolerance questions are 
posed in three forms, coded dichotomously: whether an proponent of the group 
should be allowed to speak in one’s community (allowed/not allowed), whether an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Taken from Pres. Eisenhower’s second inaugural address on January 21, 1957. 
4 Putnam and Campbell (2010) provide numerous interesting anecdotes on faith in America. 
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individual from the group should be allowed to teach at a college or university in the 
community (allowed/not allowed), and whether one would favor removing a book 
promoting the specified group from the public library – upon the suggestion of a 
fellow community member (remove/not remove).  
The types of individuals inquired about includes: an anti-religionist 
“somebody who is against all churches and religion,” a racist “a person who claims 
Blacks to be inferior,” a communist “an admitted communist,” a militarist “a person 
who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country,” 
and a homosexual “an admitted homosexual.” All of the preceding questions were 
initiated in the 1970s and have been asked in subsequent iterations of the survey 
(generally two-year intervals) 5. 
It should be mentioned that the GSS definition of an atheist is particularly 
inadequate because atheism does not precipitate being “against all churches and 
religion”, but defining the term can be cumbersome generally (as highlighted above). 
Interestingly, what the question is really getting at is attitudes toward antitheism, yet 
we have seen that people generally deduce a standard meaning from different 
expressions of nonbelief. For continuity, I have labeled the anti-religionist response 
rates as “atheist.” 
Below are graphs displaying the percentage of respondents who expressed 
tolerance toward the group by allowing the particular activity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Socialists (defined as “a person favoring government ownership of all railroads and big 
industries”) were included in the tolerance battery for three years of the survey, but were 
excluded here due to the absence of a more extensive time series. 
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Figure 2.1: GSS rates of allowing such an individual speak in your community. 
 
Figure 2.2: GSS rates of acceptance of a text written by such an individual.  
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Figure 2.3: GSS rates of allowing the employment of a teacher belonging to such a group. 
 
 First, it is apparent, due to the overall positive slopes, that Americans have 
become more tolerant over time. Or, more specifically, citizens are less willing to 
restrict minority groups’ speech, print, and employment as university faculty. While 
all three formulations of questions show increased acceptance over time, the 
magnitudes of the slopes vary in degree. The scales are also noteworthy, as the public 
speech and public library book variables receive markedly greater acceptance than 
public teachers from the evaluated groups. This is not particularly surprising, as a 
teacher is likely more influential on an individual than a speech or a book, and 
respondents might be more willing to censor information children take in (despite the 
question explicitly referencing institutions of learning for adults). Overall, Americans 
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are much more accepting of speech from these unpopular groups than the other 
formulations of tolerance.  
 A number of interesting trends emerge when looking at the particular 
differences between groups, but is important to note that the only thing most of these 
categories have in common is their inclusion in the GSS survey, and I do not intend 
to imply they share characteristics by placing them in the same graph – they are 
included to be comprehensive.  
Racists are the only group that remained relatively static or experienced a 
decline in acceptance. They presently receive the least acceptance in all three 
categories, though have not been categorically the most likely to be censored. 
Communists and militarists have remained near the least favorable. Communists are 
unique in that they comprise a two-pronged “threat” as a Cold War rival and a 
community of atheists, making it unsurprising that they fall below atheists in terms of 
acceptance.  Homosexuals are the only ones that fare better than atheists in their 
acceptance as speakers and educators. Overall, homosexuals have really made 
strides in garnering acceptance over the last two decades – an indication that the gay 
rights movement has been successful in changing American’s minds.  
Next, Figure 2.4 shows the GSS trends exclusively on atheists to remove some 
of the noise of the other graphs. 
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Figure 2.4: GSS rates of acceptance for atheists across all three questions. 
 
 As mentioned, there has been a pronounced decline in citizens being willing 
to categorically exclude atheists from public life on account of their religious 
dispositions, but there seems to be a drop in attitudes since the turn of the century. 
And there is still much headway to be made. 
 Figure 2.5 provides a visual display of the Gallup poll indicating one’s 
willingness to vote for a generally well-qualified presidential candidate of their party 
that is also part of a marginalized group. It should be noted that these polls show 
evidence that particular candidates may cue respondents, rather than the group itself. 
For example, in Jones (2007) liberals are more willing to support individuals from all 
categories listed, except Mormons – indicating their aversion might have actually 
 
 
	  
13	  
been to Mitt Romney. Generally, signs that a poll is measuring something other than 
it purports is worrisome, but I contend the results are still meaningful. For one, there 
has not been a major presidential candidate that is an atheist (to public knowledge), 
so a particular candidate could not drive respondents’ aversion. And the dearth of 
atheist candidates is unlikely to be the root of unwillingness to vote for one, as there 
has not been a homosexual candidate, or a Jewish major party nominee.  
 As we see, atheists are consistently ill favored – the only subset that fails to 
reach a simple majority of support. Homosexuals have seen a sharp increase in 
electability, though they still fare much better out of the political context. One can 
also see the obstacle faced by the Catholic President Kennedy during the 1960 
election. Overall, it is clear that atheists face significant distaste from the citizens of 
the United States.   
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Figure 2.5: Gallup poll results of willingness to vote for a presidential candidate that is 
generally well qualified and from your party, as well as one of the listed qualifiers. 
 
Scholarship on Nonbelievers 
 Religious “nones” – those expressing no religious affiliation – were the focus 
of early investigations into the category of individuals deviating from traditional belief 
in America (Vernon 1968), and are presently a rapidly growing group (Putnam and 
Campbell 2010). It was not until more recent history that researchers narrowed their 
focus to exploring nonbelief specifically. As such, we now have a general idea of 
who is more prone to having these views, and how the larger citizenry regards 
persons who hold them.  
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 Investigations over the past decade have reported as few as 3%, and as many 
as 8%, of US citizens do not believe in God (Zuckerman 2007), and there are a 
number of demographic characteristics that are correlated with nonbelief. While 
authors stress avoiding lumping atheists, agnostics, and other skeptics into one mass 
(Keysar 2007), the differences between these groups are not pronounced, and still 
effectively differentiate them from the general public. Nonbelievers tend to be young, 
white, male, and well educated (Sherkat 2008). Sherkat (2008) also finds that being 
married or widowed is associated with higher religious conviction. Geographically, 
nonbelievers are rather scarce in the South, and are most prevalent in the Pacific 
Northwest (Keysar 2007). Literature has also shown positive correlations between IQ 
and atheism in the US (Kanazawa 2010) and internationally (Lynn, Harvey, Nyborg 
2009). While the correlation between IQ and atheism exists, establishing causation is 
tricky, and it is not clear cross-national comparisons are fruitful, so it is not explicit 
what conclusions to draw from these findings (if there are any). 
 The distaste for atheists in America and elsewhere has inspired a few 
researchers to look into the nature of this aversion. Penny Edgell, Joseph Gerteis, and 
Douglas Hartmann (2006) provide one of the most and revealing explorations into 
attitudes toward atheists. They conducted a random-digit dial telephone survey that 
included 2,081 Americans in 2003, followed by in-depth interviews to other 
individuals by graduate students in 2004. Their goal was to determine how willing 
respondents were to draw barriers between themselves and others in public and 
private life. Their metric for public acceptance was whether particular groups share 
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their “vision for America,” and for private acceptance they asked whether they would 
approve of their son or daughter marrying an individual from the particular group. 
The groups inquired about were atheists, Muslims, homosexuals, conservative 
Christians, recent immigrants, Hispanics, Jews, Asian Americans, African Americans, 
and White Americans – though recent immigrants and homosexuals were excluded 
from the marriage question. In each of the formulations, atheists topped the list of the 
least accepted – by a significant margin. Thirty-nine percent of respondents did not 
feel atheists shared their vision for America, and forty-nine percent would disapprove 
of their child marrying an atheist.  Muslims trailed atheists in both categories by 
about 13 percentage points. 
 The authors go on to construct models for predicting antipathy to atheists and 
find a number of characteristics to be significant predictors. African Americans, 
individuals with higher incomes, persons with higher religious involvement, those 
who are conservative Protestants, and religious determinists are all more likely to 
reject atheists in public life. Whereas better educated individuals, those who report 
religious diversity in their social networks, and respondents in Democratic-leaning 
areas are more likely to accept atheists in public life. Interestingly, those who live in 
areas with more religious adherents are also less likely to reject atheists as sharing 
their vision for America. Additionally, those who say they value religious diversity, 
are sympathetic to African Americans, say America is strong so long as we all follow 
the same rules, and those who believe the government should guarantee equal 
treatment of all religions are all less likely to reject atheists. And those who desire the 
 
 
	  
17	  
nation’s laws to be rooted in common religious belief are more likely to reject 
atheists. Most relationships persist with respect to approving of an atheist son- or 
daughter-in-law, yet the only demographic characteristic that remains significant 
through all the private-life models is age – older respondents are less accepting of an 
atheist marrying their child.  
 While all of these factors are significant predictors of anti-atheist attitudes, the 
strongest predictor of the public rejection is whether one feels society’s evaluations of 
right and wrong should be based on God’s law – even stronger than one’s level of 
religious involvement. Conversely, for the private metric, religious involvement exerts 
the most influence, which is not particularly surprising. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
Americans are at least partially averse to atheists because they feel God’s law is 
integral to shaping the direction for our country – a notion embodied by President 
Eisenhower’s quote that rings in the chapter.  
An inquiry by Will Gervais, Azim Shariff, and Ara Norenzayan (2011) also 
looks into the origin of anti-atheist attitudes. Their main contention is that religion is a 
mechanism to promote cooperation in society, and as such the root of anti-atheist 
antipathy is distrust. In particular, they attempt to delineate whether the antipathy is 
driven by distrust, disgust, or general dislike.  
 First, they distributed a survey to Americans to determine their attitudes 
toward atheists compared to those of homosexuals as a litmus test for how people 
perceive individuals that deviate from religious norms – using a feeling thermometer 
for general warmth. Further, they asked respondents to score them on distrust and 
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disgust scales. As they predicted, they found atheists were less desirable than 
homosexuals, and that atheists scored higher on distrust than disgust, while 
homosexuals were high on disgust and low on distrust. This finding is not particularly 
extraordinary, especially since homosexuality entails sex acts – an association that is 
in itself more likely to promote disgust rather than distrust. 
 Moving on, they then investigate, using University of British Columbia 
students, how likely students were to say an individual who was of a particular group 
committed cheating behavior – each respondent receiving one of four random 
descriptors. The descriptors were a Christian, a Muslim, an atheist, and a rapist. Their 
intent was to determine whether atheists would receive lower scores than a religious 
majority, religious minority, or someone who has been proven to betray trust. As it 
turns out, and this is why the article received attention (in turn piquing my interest in 
this topic and partially motivating this inquiry), atheists are deemed likely to commit 
a hit-and-run and take money from a lost wallet without seeking out the owner at 
higher rates than the other three groups. Rapists came in at a relatively close second, 
while Muslims, followed by Christians were not deemed very likely to do such things. 
The results are enlightening in that they show atheists are not trusted, but it is not 
immediately evident why rapists would evoke distrust rather than disgust themselves. 
In fact, I suspect rapists would have scored off the charts on the disgust meter, more 
so than distrust. As such, I think they could have found a better proxy for someone 
who has betrayed society’s trust that would have been more interesting to see 
compared to atheists (e.g., a burglar, a robber, or a free-rider of any variety). It would 
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be much more insightful to see how an atheists stack up against someone “with a 
background of betraying trust” that does not inspire such a visceral reaction of disgust 
– the very thing they deemed important to distinguish distrust from.  
 In any event, it is evident that atheists are distrusted, and they go on to show 
that this distrust is not merely a dislike, the distrust is partially triggered by belief in 
God, and that it will hinder them from being desired for high-trust positions (caring 
for children).  In another article, this time by authors Gervais and Norenzayan (2012), 
the depth of this distrust is put to test. In these experiments, participants are primed 
by watching one of two videos that reference the effectiveness of the Vancouver 
police department, and then their perceptions of atheists are evaluated. As it turns 
out, reminders of secular authority reduce atheist distrust, and this effect does not 
persist for other unfavorable groups, nor does it reduce the level of disgust for other 
groups. This provides one insight into how to mitigate anti-atheist attitudes.  
 A perplexing aspect of the hostility toward atheists is they are a small, 
unidentifiable, and largely disorganized segment of the population. So it is surprising 
that they garner such animosity, as intolerance is generally dependent upon the 
perception that the group is threatening – and the greater that threat, the more fervent 
the intolerance (Gibson 2006). Due to their scarcity and relative anonymity it is not 
evident that atheists pose much of a threat. Gervais (2011) looks into this relationship 
and finds the inverse relationship for atheists: as their perceived prevalence increases, 
attitudes toward them improve. This finding, in addition to the evidence that 
reminders of secular authority improve attitudes toward atheists, provides signs that 
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there are inroads to countering the persistent aversion to the group. In light of the 
trends observed above, these results are encouraging. Further, I believe I have found 
another area in which negativity directed at atheists can be inhibited.  
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CHAPTER 3 
FOR GOD AND COUNTRY6: THE SUPPOSITION AND ASSESSMENT  
I don’t know that atheists should be considered as citizens, nor should they be 
considered patriots. This is one nation under God.”  
       —Pres. George H.W. Bush, 19877 
 
Patriotism, as distinct from nationalism, is a sentiment that is particularly 
useful in a country like the United States, which is geographically expansive and 
ethnically and racially diverse. The US has experienced massive shifts in culture 
throughout our history, due partly to the character of the original colonies, as well as 
the massive influx of immigrants from all over the world throughout time. Though 
these shocks have not been without complications – a civil war no less – America has 
overcome many obstacles other states are still wrestling with. Citizens’ affinity for the 
country, and its core principles, is partially to credit for this. That said, part of my 
personal adoration for the United States is its history of recognizing instances where 
its practices did not align with its creed and remedying them accordingly. Of course, 
many of these cases were ones where the country faced some of its most difficult 
periods, as rectifying entrenched credo is difficult. Again, I want to be cautious in 
drawing comparisons across history, as doing so is commonly fraught with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The motto of The American Legion, a patriotic veterans organization established after WWI. 
7 The reputability of this quote has previously been called into question, as the reporter who 
fielded the response was a print journalist (this was many moons before digital media and 
gaffe-fiendish pundits); however, documents from Bush Sr.’s Presidential library corroborate 
his telling. 
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exaggerations, and can quickly become disrespectful to roads previously forged. 
Nonetheless, I believe the pervasive “ceremonial deism” – as judges have phrased it 
– and the flagrantly religious rhetoric we hear from politicians, is at least partially 
responsible for the antipathy directed at nonbelievers in the United States. Dislike, or 
distrust as it were, of atheists is something that persists in most countries, yet I think 
the United States is markedly less accepting of nonbelief with respect to other 
industrialized nations, at least in part, because of how patriotism is characterized. As 
such, I have found empirical support for this link, and I believe it serves as motivation 
to reconsider the intent and consequences of some of these practices.  
 
Theoretical Development 
Finding instances where American patriotism and deism are amalgamated is 
no chore. And though there is no denying the religious piety of the Founding Fathers, 
the 20th Century saw the largest promulgation of state-endorsed deism in the 
country’s history. Contextually, the US spent a large portion of the last century 
competing with the communist Soviet Union, leading to many lines being drawn in 
the sand distinguishing “us” from “them.” This differentiation took many forms, and 
one of the distinctions heavily drawn upon was the USSR’s state-sponsored atheism 
versus the largely devout (and primarily Protestant) US population. While this 
relationship was fodder for the inclusion of deism into our patriotic practices, it very 
well could have been justification for those looking for such an overlap to begin with. 
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In any event, it is pertinent to look at some of the instances of deism in patriotic 
rituals and symbols with an eye to their origin. 
 First, as Sen. Joseph Lieberman reminds us in the epigraph of Chapter 1, as 
well as Pres. George H.W. Bush at the beginning of this chapter, the US Pledge of 
Allegiance explicitly states we are “one nation under God.” Schools in 70% of US 
states are required – with varying degrees of ability for individuals to opt out – to 
recite the Pledge of Allegiance, and another 10% are encouraged to, as decreed by 
state legislation. Seventeen of these states enacted such legislation in 2002 and 2003, 
during the post-9/11 wave of patriotism (Piscatelli 2003). I recited this pledge as a 
child in Arizona, and my parents did so as well; however, when my grandparents 
recited it the phrase “under God” was not there, as it was added in 1954. The other 
most blatant endorsement of belief in God by the US was also adopted under 
President Eisenhower: “In God We Trust” being adopted as the national motto in 
1956. The phrase first appeared on coins in 1864 “largely because of the increased 
religious sentiment existing during the Civil War” (U.S. Department of the Treasury), 
and is now also on paper currency.  
 There are many other, more traditionally rooted, governmental expressions of 
belief. For example, the marshal of the Supreme Court begins each session by crying: 
“God save the United States and this Honorable Court!” And the National Day of 
Prayer has origins in our founding. These pronouncements of deism have 
experienced numerous challenges in court – cited as violations of the Establishment 
Clause to the Constitution – and some judges have agreed with plaintiffs, but in all 
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cases these rulings have been overturned due to the “secular” purpose the displays 
serve (i.e., promoting patriotism) (Corbin 2010). These “secular” displays of deism are 
referred to by the courts as “ceremonial deism,” and are deemed secular because 
they do not promote religion over another. Further, they do not inflict harm to 
nonbelievers (“social exclusion” has been deemed harmless), so these rituals are 
unlikely to go away any time soon.  
 I contend these pervasive juxtapositions take their toll on the American 
psyche, as evidenced by the quotes throughout, which is in no way an exhaustive list 
of condemnations of atheists on patriotic grounds. I am more than willing to grant 
that questioning a foe’s patriotism is a common straw man argument, yet even 
attempts at defending atheists allude to the notion that they are perceived as less 
patriotic (see Pres. George W. Bush’s quote that kicks off the concluding chapter). 
This trend seems too common and persistent over time to be independent 
phenomena. Literature on the formation of attitudes helps cast light on the where this 
negativity may stem. On topics where individuals have little specific knowledge – as 
is the case with Americans on atheists – their general attitudes are employed to form 
a specific response (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). This hierarchical formulation of 
attitudes seems to be fitting for viewpoints on atheists: American citizens have 
general notions of what patriotism entails, often involving acknowledgement of a 
deity, coupled with little knowledge on atheists or their prevalence, so they perceive 
them as not ascribing to American ideals and look disparagingly upon them as a 
consequence. Support for this comes from Gervais (2011), as when provided with the 
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impression that they are prevalent – knowledge they did not possess previously – they 
then recognize atheists are likely to ascribe to similar values of citizenship, and are 
more genial in their dispositions toward them. 
Furthermore, there is nothing explicitly unpatriotic about nonbelief. Just 
because references to God are part of citizen’s shared history, that fact does not 
necessitate one has to ascribe to the notion in order to have adoration for the United 
States. Indeed, there are many ideals once held that are better left as relics of history, 
and it is likely there will be many more – time may find ceremonial deism to be 
within this category. 
 
Empirical investigation 
 The General Social Survey provides the opportunity to test the effect of 
patriotism on attitudes toward atheists, and is to my knowledge the only data source 
that captures values for both patriotism and attitudes on atheists – though patriotism 
was only measured in 1996 and 2004. As the aforementioned narrative suggests, I 
hypothesize that patriotism will be negatively associated with acceptance of atheists.  
The metric I use for patriotism was selected for its rather tempered expression 
of devotion for the country, in hopes of capturing patriotism rather than nationalism. 
An additional criterion was the desire for a variable that provided some deviation 
across scores – that is, one that did not have a majority of respondents responding 
identically (a tricky task when measuring American patriotism). I settled on the 
variable “ambetter” (displayed as “Patriotism”), in which respondents are asked to the 
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extent they agree the US is “generally speaking, a better country than most other 
countries.” I then recoded the variable so higher scores were indicative of greater 
patriotism – the logic here being a more emphatic patriot is likely to embrace 
patriotic symbols more literally, as well as be more likely to base more specific 
attitudes on the general notions surrounding patriotism. 
The measure selected for attitudes toward atheists is the variable for approval 
of an “anti-religionist speaking in your community” – the same variable highlighted 
above. I recoded it so a higher score equates to approval for an “atheist” speaker. I 
believe this variable best captures public attitudes on civic participation – following 
the example of Edgell et al. (2006). 
I also employ a multitude of controls that have been shown to impart 
influence on attitudes toward atheists – most being demographic variables. The 
demographic variables are standard inclusions when investigating attitudes, and the 
variables concerning religion also have roots in the literature (Edgell et al. 2006, 
Keysar 2007, Sherkat 2008).  
Age is included in the model, as younger individuals have been shown to be 
more prone to nonbelief, which might mute the effect of patriotism. I control for sex 
by measuring whether the respondent is a female. Women tend to report greater 
religiosity than men, which will likely influence their attitudes on atheists. As detailed 
above, education is a significant predictor of nonbelief, and it is likely better 
educated individuals have a more cosmopolitan perspective on the world – which 
likely has implications for their patriotic dispositions. Attitudes on faith and patriotism 
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vary across ethnic and racial groups, so controlling for such is desirable when 
measuring attitudes. GSS provides limited data with respect to their respondents, so 
the only racial group included is Blacks – who report higher levels of religiosity in 
America. Income has been shown to be a significant predictor of support for atheism, 
so it is controlled for to reduce its effect on the model. Party identification is 
included, with leaning moderates lumped with the party they lean toward. Party 
identification is formative in, as well as indicative of, attitudes toward certain groups, 
and also correlates with religiosity. Primary religious categories were included, as 
they are likely influential in attitudes toward nonbelievers, as well as the dynamics of 
church-state relations. Religiosity, as measured by frequency of church attendance, is 
included as well as it has been shown religiosity influences attitudes toward atheists. 
Finally, geographic region was controlled for, as regional culture has been shown to 
impart influence on attitudes toward atheists, and presumably influences the fervency 
and character of patriotism. 
I had originally included variables for year, Judaism, and Mountain region, but 
all of them possessed collinearity when I initially ran the model, so they were 
dropped. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the variables and descriptions of their 
coding. 
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Table 3.1: Variable summary. 
 
My dependent variable is binary, so I utilized logistic regression to determine 
the effect patriotism has on acceptance of atheists. Table 3.2 provides the descriptive 
statistics for the model. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description
Age Age in years (18 to 89)
Female Sex variable (0=Male, 1=Female)
Education Years of formal schooling (0 to 20)
Black Race variable (0=Other, 1=Black)
Income Inflation adjusted real income - in 2000 dollars (ln Income 6 to 12)
Democrat R a Democrat (0=Other, 1=Str Demo, Wk Demo, Dem leaning Ind)
Independent R an Independent (0=Other, 1=Independent)
Republican R a Republican (0=Other, 1=Str Rep, Wk Rep, Rep leaning Ind)
Religiosity Freq. of church attendance (0=Never to 8=More than once a week)
Protestant Protestant religious identification (0=Other, 1=Protestant)
Catholic Catholic religious identification (0=Other, 1=Catholic)
None None religious identification (0=Other, 1=None)
East Region code (0=Other, 1=East)
South Region code (0=Other, 1=South)
Central Region code (0=Other, 1=Central)
Pacific Region code (0=Other, 1=Pacific)
Patriotism Generally speaking, America is a better country than most others 
(1=Strongly Disagree to 5=Strongly agree)
Atheism Allow an atheist to speak in your comm. (0=Not Allow, 1=Allow)
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Table 3.2: Logit model results. Source: General Social Survey. 
 
As Table 3.2 illustrates, the relationship between patriotism and atheist 
approval is negative and significant with a p-value of .001, so patriotism is associated 
with less support for atheists. A number of the controls reach significance as well. 
Being young, identifying as a Democrat, and having greater amounts of formal 
education are all significant predictors of acceptance of atheists. The income variable 
is positive and reaches significance as well, so increasing ones income increases their 
acceptance of atheists. Being Black and attending church more frequently are both 
significant predictors of disapproval of atheists. So, for better or for worse, the 
connection between patriotism and antipathy toward atheists is present. 
Atheist Coef. Std. Err. P>z
Patriotism -0.413 0.124 0.001
Age -0.024 0.006 0.000
Female -0.155 0.199 0.437
Education 0.176 0.038 0.000
Black -0.665 0.291 0.022
Income 0.308 0.105 0.003
Democrat 1.622 0.663 0.014
Independent 1.152 0.687 0.094
Republican 1.396 0.659 0.034
Religiosity -0.072 0.039 0.068
Protestant 0.368 0.441 0.404
Catholic -0.248 0.454 0.585
None 0.585 0.537 0.276
East 0.410 0.415 0.323
South -0.061 0.389 0.875
Central 0.433 0.405 0.286
Pacific 0.355 0.439 0.419
constant -2.938 1.515 0.052
Number of obs: 746
Pseudo R2: 0.1555
 
 
	  
30	  
CHAPTER 4 
THIS LAND WAS MADE FOR YOU AND ME: FORTH 
“The great thing about America is that you should be allowed to worship any way 
you want. And if you chose not to worship, you’re equally as patriotic as somebody 
who does worship.” 
       —Pres. George W. Bush, 20058 
  
 President Bush’s quote above, while refreshing in light of the epigraphs that 
precede it, is indicative of the nature of anti-atheist prejudice, as it shows one 
speaking for tolerance of nonbelievers feels the need to defend their patriotism. 
Conversely, favorable comments on atheists from politicians are rare, so the quote 
might embody the increased acceptance for atheists the GSS survey has displayed 
over the years. Yet presently, those who do not hold religious belief face serious 
barriers to private and public life. And I contend these barriers ought to be 
permeated. Because if a group is systematically denied holding public office for their 
religious beliefs, we have cause for concern, as democracy is strengthened through 
pluralism. What is more, given the finding that perceived prevalence of atheists 
improves attitudes toward them, nonbelievers holding public office could potentially 
stifle some of the antipathy toward the group as a whole. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Taken from a 2005 press conference in which Pres. George W. Bush was asked his opinion 
on how faith is employed in political debates. 
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 In any event, the finding that enmity toward nonbelievers is partially born out 
of patriotism gives cause for reconsidering whether rituals of ceremonial deism serve 
merely a secular purpose. And while the evidence above is some indication that 
there are unintended consequences of patriotic displays that reference God, more 
investigations into the matter would be valuable. In particular, an experimental 
setting would allow causation to be further established, as prompts of ceremonial 
deism – or other forms of patriotic symbolism – could be carried out preceding the 
measurement of attitudes toward nonbelievers and other minority groups. Also, due 
to the deviation in ceremonial deism across states (e.g., the pledge requirements), 
evaluating attitudes toward atheists in an across-state comparative context could be 
fruitful. GSS only provides region, and each of those regions contain states that 
require the pledge be recited as well as those that do not, so another data set will be 
required for such an investigation. 
In any event, if more evidence emerges that our patriotic practices are in fact 
partially to blame for the negativity directed at these groups, then we might decide it 
appropriate to change the content of some of our rituals once again. To be sure, there 
are a lot of moving parts with respect to both the independent and dependent 
variables, so it is unlikely that changes to our patriotic practices will herald warmth 
for nonbelievers overnight (in fact, it might bring the opposite at the onset), but that 
might not be the only point. At the very least, references to deism provide an air of 
legitimacy to claims against the patriotism of atheists, and whether institutionalizing 
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practices that promote intolerance is something Americans are willing to support is 
an emphatically political question. And I contend it is one worth asking. 
It is important to once again acknowledge that most nonbelievers do not face 
extreme forms of prejudice. However, that is not worthy of chalking up the problem 
as irrelevant. Access to public life is not only crucial for those in the minority; it is 
also to the benefit of the majority. 
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